tion of outliers that require more urgent
and closer attention by personnel whose
roles mandate their attention to particular areas of project performance and
associated project activity. Like responsibilities, within-project routines can be
distinguished from across-project routines situated in the project network.
Again, we argue that the former may be
more deliberate, and the latter of a more
emergent nature. However, coordination
of project networks—not unlike supply
chains or networks—may require more
managerial attention to interorganizational routines (Zollo, Reuer, & Singh,
2002) on the network level.
The importance of repeated collaborative experiences on this level of analysis upon choice of governance modes
is borne out in several studies. Davies
and Brady (2000) develop the concept
of economies of repetition to show that
project-based organizations can offer
“repeatable solutions by recycling experience from one project for others in the
same line of business” (Davies & Brady,
2000, p. 932). Crucial to the achievement
of economies of repetition is the very
development of routines, which may—
as interorganizational routines—also be
in effect in project networks. Once having undertaken a one-off project, the
same participants are involved in successive ones of the same type in order to
consolidate routines, which they adapt
according to the contingencies of each
project (D’Andrea, 2014). García-Canal,
Valdés-Llaneza, and Sánchez-Lorda
(2014) argue that when developing new
collaborative projects with the same
partner, firms tend to repeat the same
contractual form used in previous projects to take advantage of the governance
routines developed in the past. Support
for their predictions is provided by an
analysis of a sample of technology alliances carried out by European firms. We
assume that the inclination toward repetition is not restricted to formal contracts but includes informal routines as
well, in particular if project networks
are composed of project participants
from previous collaborative projects.
instance, of the production of a series
or a portfolio of projects to be managed with regard to cross-project relationships. From the music industry,
typically clustered in major cities, it is
well known that the “majors” use contracts to coordinate projects (Lorenzen
& Frederiksen, 2005).
Though not focusing on projects,
Huang, Cheng, and Tseng (2014) examined the influence of formal, contract-based controls and social controls (e.g.,
relationship-based governance) upon
the buyer–supplier cooperative performance in supply chains. Empirical evidence obtained via a mail survey from
106 firms participating in the Taiwanese
“Center Satellite Production System”
indicates that ( 1) there is an inverted
U-shaped relationship between formal
control and cooperative performance;
( 2) social control has a consistent positive effect on cooperative performance;
and ( 3) the joint use of formal control
and social control could enhance cooperative performance in supply chains,
but only in cases with moderate usage
of formal control. Otherwise, social
control becomes a supportive factor
that repairs cooperative performance
damage from overwhelmingly applied
formal control. This finding also makes
sense for projects and project networks;
in other words, we would expect that
contractual governance is more effective if used in moderation and complemented by more relationship-based
modes of governance.
Routines are repetitive patterns of
interdependent actions (Parmigiani &
Howard-Grenville, 2011). In projects,
routines are often supported by shared
artifacts (including information sys-
tems) and typically reflect established
cycles of project work activities and their
monitoring. These routines define the
expected work flow and the milestones
for evaluating project progress. Routines
serve as a complement to responsibilities
insofar as many of the project manage-
ment routines facilitate the monitoring
of project progress in meeting perfor-
mance requirements and the identifica-
be embedded in corporations, but also
in other types of organizations (project-
based or not) and even in interorganiza-
tional networks or fields.
On the level of the focal project,
responsibilities refer to the requirements
or deliverables expected of all project
participants and their liability for failing
to fulfill these responsibilities, which
encompass the four T’s of temporary
systems associated with project-based
organizing: to manage a specific sets of
tasks that are time-limited, and typically
performed by a semi-temporary collection or team of individuals with different expertise who collectively enable
the sponsoring or host organization
to transition from one state of performance and capability to a new state
(Bakker, 2010; Lundin & Söderholm,
1995). More often than not, the responsibility for project outcome, in other
words, predictable delivery of projects
in time, quality, and cost, is allocated
to a project manager, sometimes supported by a project management office
(PMO), typically installed in organizations that run portfolios of projects in
order to standardize project management and enhance across-project learning (Hobbs, Aubry, & Thullier, 2008;
Narayanan & DeFillippi, 2012). Only in
rare cases is this responsibility shared
among project members.
Though for any single project Lundin and Söderholm’s (1995) four T’s
result from more or less intentional
decisions or design choices, the same
four T’s can be identified on the network level as well for clarifying responsibilities. However, despite increasing
attempts that Sydow and colleagues
have observed in the television industry to coordinate activities more reflexively also on this level (Manning &
Sydow, 2011; Sydow & Windeler, 1999),
the whole network of relationships
is—not least because of its complexity
and dynamics—more of an emergent
nature (Mintzberg & McHugh, 1985).
Nevertheless, contracts regulating
responsibilities are likely to play a role
on the network level as well. Think, for
