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decisions made during the formative
stages of the development process.
Causes are fundamentally constructed rather than found, so it is suggested that future research should focus
on explaining people’s behaviors to
examine their mental models, environmental factors, and the other influences
that affect their decision making, which
can lead to errors and subsequent
rework. To undertake such research
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should be placed on working backward
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which is the effect of symptoms derived
from a systems environment where
tools, tasks, and operations are inter-
dependent. It is impossible to identify a
single cause for rework. A complex array
of inextricably linked variables and con-
ditions interact with one another to
produce the event. In the cases studied,
it was revealed that production pressure
was an underlying latent condition that
provided fertile conditions for influ-
encing critical decision making and
the behavior of people and organiza-
tions involved with FPSOs. In one case
presented, the operator was an inex-
perienced organizational entity in deliv-
ering an FPSO, though its managers and
engineers had extensive experience in
their design and construction, which
was acquired with previous employers.
Despite such experience, rework still
occurred, which resulted in cost and
This study demonstrates that the
pressure to produce oil focused management’s attention onto production,
which tended to distort risk perception
and led to a further focus on production.
This finding aligns with the current theory that has been propagated to explain
organizational accidents. In the case of
rework, the error or omission is identified before an accident occurs. The danger is that if an error or omission is not
identified, the propensity for an accident or major catastrophe increases.
It is irresponsible for managers and
engineers to operate in (or even contribute to) unsafe environments, such
as those offshore, to consider rework
“normal” under operating conditions.
Notwithstanding the potential for loss
of life and/or environmental damage
because of the failure of an offshore
facility, there are implications for shareholders and those contractors working at the sharp end. For shareholders,
there is the potential for dividends to be
adversely impacted, as production may
be delayed. For contractors, a reduction
in profit margins and productivity may
be experienced as they attend to rectifying problems that have manifested from