Project Management Journal

PAPE
RS
ABSTRACT ■ INTRODUCTION

Rework is a chronic and recurrent problem in construction, engineering, and natural resource (i.e., oil, gas, mineral sands) projects that adversely impacts project performance, productivity, and safety (Robinson-Fayek Dissanayake, & Campero, 2004). Surprisingly, rework has largely been ignored and deemed to be a normal function of operations (Moore, 2012) and is often deliberately concealed (Ford & Sterman, 2003). Because rework fundamentally pertains to correcting errors arising from unanticipated events, the question is: “How do we anticipate it when, by definition, its occurrence is unanticipated” (Pinto, 2013)? Rework costs are implicitly accommodated within a project’s traditional cost contingency, yet an allowance for it is unacceptable to clients because it is deemed to be something that should not occur. Indeed, contractual tenders that include cost, time, and disruption as a result of rework render consultants and contractors potentially uncompetitive. With increasingly tighter profit margins and lower productivity rates being experienced, particularly in Australia, rework is untenable as business competitiveness is severely jeopardized. To prevent rework, various approaches are being promulgated. These include visualization technologies, modularization, lean construction, and relationship contracting. Such approaches may yield some project performance improvement but they merely abate rework, because human behavior is all too adept at concealing problems and committing errors (Ford & Sterman, 2003).

Studies of rework causation have tended to focus narrowly on identifying specific causal factors (e.g., Hwang, Thomas, Haas, & Caldas, 2009; Zhang, Haas, Goodrum, Caldas, & Granger, 2012). This approach, however, is coun-terintuitive, because rework causation can only be understood by reviewing the whole project system in which it occurs and examining how variables dynamically interact with one another (Ackermann & Eden, 2005). Within this context, an operational system, such as a construction, engineering, or resource project, can be categorized as having “blunt” and “sharp” ends (Dekker, 2006). The “sharp end” represents the project site where people are carrying out the physical work associated with project delivery. The “blunt end,” on the other hand, encompasses the organization(s) that support, drive, and shape the activities of the design and construction process. The blunt end (which includes governments, regulatory bodies, financial institutions, and clients) provides information to facilitate design and construction, but invariably introduces project cost and time constraints. Strategic decisions taken at the blunt end can create, shape, and stimulate opportunities for errors to materialize (Dekker, 2006). Too often, time constraints restrict design-related activities and lead to incomplete tasks and/or inadequately prepared

Making Sense of Rework Causation
in Offshore Hydrocarbon Projects

Peter E. D. Love, Department of Civil Engineering, Curtin University, Australia

Fran Ackermann, Curtin Business School, Curtin University, Australia

Jim Smith, Institute of Sustainable Development and Architecture Bond University, Australia Zahir Irani, Brunel Business School, Brunel University, England

David J. Edwards, Birmingham City Business School, Birmingham City University, England

Retrospective sensemaking is used to determine how and why rework in offshore hydrocarbon projects occurred. Staff from organizations operating at the blunt end (e.g., clients/design engineers providing finance and information) and those at the sharp end (e.g., contractors at the “ coalface”) of a project’s supply chain were interviewed to make sense of the rework that occurred. The analysis identified the need for managers to de-emphasize an environment that prioritizes production over other considerations and instead systematically examine mechanisms and factors that shape people’s performance. Limitations of the research and the implications for managerial practice are also identified.