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ABSTRACT ■ INTRODUCTION
Rework is a chronic and recurrent problem in construction, engineering, and natural resource (i.e., oil, gas, mineral sands) projects that adversely impacts project performance, productivity, and safety (Robinson-Fayek Dissanayake, & Campero, 2004). Surprisingly, rework has largely been
ignored and deemed to be a normal function of operations (Moore, 2012)
and is often deliberately concealed (Ford & Sterman, 2003). Because rework
fundamentally pertains to correcting errors arising from unanticipated events,
the question is: “How do we anticipate it when, by definition, its occurrence is
unanticipated” (Pinto, 2013)? Rework costs are implicitly accommodated within
a project’s traditional cost contingency, yet an allowance for it is unacceptable
to clients because it is deemed to be something that should not occur. Indeed,
contractual tenders that include cost, time, and disruption as a result of rework
render consultants and contractors potentially uncompetitive. With increasingly
tighter profit margins and lower productivity rates being experienced,
particularly in Australia, rework is untenable as business competitiveness
is severely jeopardized. To prevent rework, various approaches are being
promulgated. These include visualization technologies, modularization, lean
construction, and relationship contracting. Such approaches may yield some
project performance improvement but they merely abate rework, because
human behavior is all too adept at concealing problems and committing errors
(Ford & Sterman, 2003).
Studies of rework causation have tended to focus narrowly on identifying
specific causal factors (e.g., Hwang, Thomas, Haas, & Caldas, 2009; Zhang,
Haas, Goodrum, Caldas, & Granger, 2012). This approach, however, is coun-terintuitive, because rework causation can only be understood by reviewing
the whole project system in which it occurs and examining how variables
dynamically interact with one another (Ackermann & Eden, 2005). Within
this context, an operational system, such as a construction, engineering,
or resource project, can be categorized as having “blunt” and “sharp” ends
(Dekker, 2006). The “sharp end” represents the project site where people are
carrying out the physical work associated with project delivery. The “blunt
end,” on the other hand, encompasses the organization(s) that support, drive,
and shape the activities of the design and construction process. The blunt end
(which includes governments, regulatory bodies, financial institutions, and
clients) provides information to facilitate design and construction, but invariably introduces project cost and time constraints. Strategic decisions taken
at the blunt end can create, shape, and stimulate opportunities for errors
to materialize (Dekker, 2006). Too often, time constraints restrict design-related activities and lead to incomplete tasks and/or inadequately prepared
Making Sense of Rework Causation
in Offshore Hydrocarbon Projects
Peter E. D. Love, Department of Civil Engineering, Curtin University, Australia
Fran Ackermann, Curtin Business School, Curtin University, Australia
Jim Smith, Institute of Sustainable Development and Architecture Bond University, Australia
Zahir Irani, Brunel Business School, Brunel University, England
David J. Edwards, Birmingham City Business School, Birmingham City University, England
Retrospective sensemaking is used to
determine how and why rework in offshore
hydrocarbon projects occurred. Staff from
organizations operating at the blunt end
(e.g., clients/design engineers providing
finance and information) and those at the
sharp end (e.g., contractors at the “
coalface”) of a project’s supply chain were interviewed to make sense of the rework that
occurred. The analysis identified the need for
managers to de-emphasize an environment
that prioritizes production over other considerations and instead systematically examine
mechanisms and factors that shape people’s
performance. Limitations of the research and
the implications for managerial practice are
also identified.
KEYWORDS: rework; error; offshore
projects; retrospection; production
pressure; learning
Project Management Journal, Vol. 47, No. 4, 16–28
© 2016 by the Project Management Institute
Published online at www.pmi.org/PMJ